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In their recent article “Knowing How,”1 Jason Stanley and 
Timothy Williamson deny that there is a fundamental 
distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that, 
claiming instead that knowledge-how is rather a form of 
knowledge-that. I contend that Stanley and Williamson are 
incorrect in rejecting the distinction between knowledge-
how and knowledge-that. Our Rylean ancestors, and Ryle 
himself, had a genuine insight in recognizing knowing-how 
and knowing-that as distinct phenomena. This discussion 
will be divided into two sections. In section 1, I discuss 
some implications of what I take to be our naïve notion of 
knowing-that. In section 2, I turn to a defense of Ryle’s 
argument in favor of the distinction between knowledge-
how and knowledge-that against the criticisms leveled 
against it by Stanley and Williamson. 
I  
Consider the following three cases: 
(1) Steve, the ski-instructor, knows how some profes-
sional skier skis the course in record time, though Steve 
is unable to do so that fast himself. 
(2) Pete, the paraplegic pianist, knows how to play the 
piano part in Beethoven’s “‘Triple Concerto’ for Violin, 
Cello and Piano in C,” Op. 56, although Pete is unfortu-
nately no longer able to do so. 
(3) Chip, the chicken-sexer, knows how to tell the sex of 
baby chicks, though he does not know how he knows. 
All three of these cases demonstrate senses in which we 
say that one knows how to φ. All three are similar in at 
least the following senses. They all involve a reliable 
disposition (where this may be a disposition to believe) or 
ability of the agents in question. Furthermore, they all 
involve personal dispositions (where these may include 
dispositions to believe) or abilities of the knowers in 
question. Thus, none of the three support the extension of 
the notion of knowing-how to non-intentional actions or 
sub-personal dispositions, such as digesting food or 
breathing. That is, no human knows how to digest food or 
to breathe, precisely because such actions are non-
intentional actions for humans. 
Despite these similarities between the three cases, there 
are some striking differences between them. Crucial 
among these for our discussion here is a pair of ways in 
which (1) and (3) markedly differ from each other. 
Whereas (3) involves a reliable ability on the part of the 
knower-how to perform an action (in the particular case 
considered, to sort chicks), (1) involves no such ability. As 
the case was presented, it was explicitly stipulated that 
Steve the ski-instructor not be able to ski in the way he 
was nevertheless reliably able to recognize as being the 
way to ski the course in record time. Thus, (3) employs a 
sense of knowledge-how involving the possession of a 
reliable ability, whereas (1) does not. We will refer to this 
sense of knowing-how as the performative sense. 
                                                     
1
 Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson, “Knowing How,” The Journal of 
Philosophy (2001): 411-44. 
There is a further way in which (1) differs from (3), the 
second of the crucial ways alluded to above. As we noted, 
(1) involves a case in which Steve the ski-instructor has a 
reliable recognitional capacity: when presented with 
various ways of skiing the course, he is reliably able to say 
which will be the way to ski it in record time. Furthermore, 
it seems reasonable to suppose that part of this recogni-
tional capacity rests in Steve’s being able to recognize, 
when he himself is skiing, which ways of skiing are 
appropriate for which sorts of powder, etc. Call this sort of 
recognition, which would seem to rest in part on phenom-
ena such as muscle-memory and other practical modes of 
presentation collectively known as the way a certain 
activity or performance “feels,” proprioceptive acquaint-
ance. Contrast the role that such acquaintance plays in (1) 
with the lack of such a phenomenon in (3). Although there 
might be some series of sub-personal mechanisms whose 
workings would characterize the way in which Chip the 
chicken-sexer sorts baby chicks, it would be a mistake to 
suppose that Chip’s ability requires that he have any sort 
of awareness of the way in which he performs that action. 
Thus, this second distinction between (1) and (3) highlights 
the second sense of knowledge-how, that of acquaintance 
with a way of bringing about a state of affairs. Call this the 
acquaintance sense. 
Note of course that, in asserting that some cases of 
knowledge-that do not fall under the acquaintance sense 
of knowledge how to φ, one need not claim that agents can 
know how to φ without being acquainted with anything – 
including, e.g., their external environment – rather, one 
need merely claim that one need not be aware of, or 
acquainted with, any particular way of φ’ing in order to 
possess knowledge how to φ. Indeed, it is imperative that 
one recognize the prevalence of cases of knowledge-that 
that do not comport with the acquaintance sense. Indeed, 
there are many sorts of abilities that one can acquire and 
exercise without having any particular sort of propriocep-
tive awareness or acquaintance. Indeed, a good deal of 
the skills honed by high performance athletes, surgeons, 
musicians, and others are ones the exercise of which is 
actually hampered by an attempt on the part of the agent 
to shape her performance on the basis of an explicit 
awareness of the way in which she performs. That is, 
acquaintance with a way of φ’ing is actually inimical to at 
least some forms of knowing-how to φ. 
The case exemplified by (2) is a particularly interesting 
one, as it poses a challenge to a naïve understanding of 
both the acquaintance and performative senses of 
knowledge-how. The difficulty posed by (2) for the 
performative notion of knowledge-how is easier to 
recognize. Pete is no longer able to perform the piano part 
of Beethoven’s “Triple Concerto;” nevertheless, we still feel 
comfortable attributing knowledge how to Pete. Nor, 
however, can we explain this fact straightforwardly in terms 
of the acquaintance sense of knowing-how. Certainly, 
there are certain proprioceptive sensations – those 
involving balance or the performance of certain specific 
muscle-tasks – that are no longer available to one who has 
lost the use of some or all of his limbs. Let us stipulate that 
Pete, due to his injury, is in such a situation. That is, were 
Pete to have the use of his limbs, he would be able reliably 




to pick out, through proprioceptive acquaintance, the way 
to play the piano part of Beethoven’s “Triple Concerto.” 
However, since he does not, Pete is no longer even 
dispositionally acquainted with the way to play the piano 
part of Beethoven’s “Triple Concerto.” That is, the 
acquaintance sense seems to be in the same situation 
with respect to cases like (2) as the performative sense: it 
seems on the face of it that we attribute knowledge how to 
Pete due to the fact that, if he had the use of his limbs, he 
would be acquainted with the way of performing the piano 
part of Beethoven’s “Triple Concerto.” This, however, is 
true of Pete’s ability as well: were he to have the use of his 
limbs, he would be able to perform the piano part.  
Let us recap. So far we have attempted to sketch an 
intuitive motivation for the idea that there are two inde-
pendent senses associated with knowledge how, an 
acquaintance sense and a performative sense, and 
provided examples of cases of knowledge how in which 
one or the other sense would not apply. It is interesting to 
note that the two senses of knowledge how do have 
striking parallels to distinct aspects of knowledge that: the 
performative sense of knowledge how mirrors the 
significance of reliability for knowledge that, whereas the 
acquaintance sense of knowledge how mirrors the fact that 
knowledge that is a representational state of subjects. 
Thus, although we will be arguing that knowledge how is 
not a form of knowledge that, it would be futile to ignore 
the significant parallels between the two phenomena.  
II 
In the last section we amassed an amount of independent 
evidence in favor of the idea that at least one sense of 
knowledge how, the performative sense, is not a form of 
knowledge that. There is still the matter, however, of 
Stanley’s and Williamson’s critique of Ryle.  
Stanley and Williamson2 suggest that Ryle argues as 
follows. He assumes (in order to employ a reductio ad 
absurdum) that [I] all knowledge how to φ is knowledge 
that ___ φ. He then argues that (a) when one intentionally 
φ’s, one employs knowledge how to φ, and (b) if one 
employs knowledge that p, one must contemplate the 
proposition that p. This means that, for any S, if S φ’s, then 
– according to (a) – S employs knowledge how to φ. By [I], 
if S employs knowledge how to φ, then S employs 
knowledge that ___ φ. According to (b), however, if S 
employs knowledge that ___ φ, then S must contemplate 
the proposition that ___ φ. But contemplating the proposi-
tion that ___ φ is itself an action. Thus begins the regress. 
In objecting to Ryle’s argument, Stanley and Williamson 
build on a reply to Ryle given by Ginet in his Knowledge, 
Perception, and Memory.3 There, Ginet argues that Ryle is 
mistaken, in the application of (b) to S’s employment of 
knowledge that ___ φ, to suggest that, when one employs 
one’s knowledge that p one performs the distinct action of 
contemplating the proposition that p. Thus, I employ my 
knowledge that opening a door is the best way to leave a 
room, and that turning a doorknob is the best way to open 
a door, by turning the knob and opening the door – and 
without contemplating the propositions in question. The 
only way that Ryle can dispute Ginet’s argument, Stanley 
and Williamson suggest, is by interpreting the contempla-
tion of propositions as a non-intentional – or otherwise 
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deflated sense – of action. However, as they rightly 
suggest, their reformulation of premise (a) of Ryle’s 
argument requires that the action in question be an 
intentional action. Thus, they argue, Ryle’s argument relies 
on an equivocation for its force; it is, in fact, unsound. 
In taking Ryle’s argument to deal simply with intentional 
actions, however, Stanley and Williamson have done him a 
disservice. In fact, Ryle considers not intentional actions, 
simpliciter, but those that we would characterize as 
“intelligent.” In the context of discussion, “intelligent” 
actions, for Ryle, are those actions that display knowledge 
how. In The Concept of Mind, for example, Ryle summa-
rizes his argument against the idea that all knowledge how 
is a species of knowledge that as follows: 
To put it quite generally, the absurd assumption made 
by the intellectualist legend [i.e., the idea that all knowl-
edge how is a form of knowledge that] is this, that a 
performance of any sort inherits all its title to intelligence 
from some anterior internal operation of planning what we 
do. … By the original argument, therefore, our intellectual 
planning process must inherit its title to shrewdness from 
yet another interior process of planning to plan, and this 
process could in turn be [analyzed with respect to its 
shrewdness]. The regress is infinite.4 
Thus, Stanley and Williamson are correct insofar as they 
see Ryle’s argument as a species of infinite regress 
argument, but incorrect in seeing the argument simply as 
referring to all intentional actions. How, exactly, are we to 
understand it? 
The argument rests on the following considerations. 
Ryle seems to characterize the “intellectualist legend,” the 
idea that knowledge how is a species of knowledge that, 
as comprised by the following thesis: 
[INTELLECTUALISM] φ’ing on the basis of one’s 
knowledge how to φ requires that one guide one’s 
actions on the basis of one’s knowledge of the proposi-
tion that ___ φ. 
The argument then seems to run as follows: 
(1) If one’s action is a knowledgeable performance of φ, 
then one φ’s on the basis of one’s knowledge how to φ. 
(2) [INTELLECTUALISM] 
(3) If one’s guidance of one’s actions on the basis of 
one’s knowledge of the proposition that ___ φ is itself to 
be knowledgeable, then one guides one’s actions on the 
basis of one’s knowledge of the proposition that ___ φ 
on the basis of one’s knowledge how to guide one’s 
actions on the basis of one’s knowledge of the proposi-





Thus, according to this analysis, Ryle’s argument does not 
rest on any independently implausible theses concerning 
what is involved in employing knowledge that p, but rather 
employs simply those theses that the intellectualist himself 
must accept. Is this in fact the case? 
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It does not seem that the intellectualist will want to object 
to premise 1, as this premise simply captures the 
difference between action on the basis of knowledge how 
– i.e., knowledgeable action – and action that accidentally 
achieves the desired result. Thus, we wouldn’t call the 
clumsy person’s accidentally flawless performance of a fla-
menco a knowledgeable performance, precisely because 
that performance was not executed on the basis of a 
knowledge how to dance the flamenco. 
Nor does it seem that the intellectualist can deny [IN-
TELLECTUALISM]. For precisely such a thesis will be 
needed if the intellectualist is to rule out the sorts of cases, 
like Chip the chicken-sexer, which motivated the performa-
tive sense of knowledge how in sections 1 and 2. That is, 
in order to be able to restrict the range of cases of knowl-
edge how to the acquaintance sense, one would have to 
argue that it is a necessary condition of S’s acting on the 
basis of knowledge how that S guide her actions on the 
basis of knowledge that ___ φ – specifically, in the case of 
Stanley and Williamson, on the basis of knowledge that w 
is a way of reliably performing φ. Indeed, this is what it 
means to say that knowledge how is a species of knowl-
edge that. 
Furthermore, it does not seem that the intellectualist will 
be able to stop the move to step 3 of the argument by 
denying that one’s guidance of one’s actions on the basis 
of one’s knowledge that need be knowledgeable. Recall 
that “knowledgeable action,” in the sense used in the 
above argument, is simply that action that is based upon 
the ability of an agent reliably to perform the given action – 
as opposed to that of an agent who, by sheer luck, 
manages to perform the same action. If the intellectualist 
were to stop the argument here, then it seems that he 
would be forced to relinquish the idea that an agent’s 
guidance of her own actions – in those cases in which the 
agent exercises her knowledge how – is itself no different 
than that of an agent who guides her actions through 
sheer luck. 
